RE: [ga] ALAC comments on proposed Bylaws modifications

[Joanna Lane <jo-uk@rcn.com>]

OK, here's another perspective.

First, let's not forget that ICANN has no future without an At Large to
which significant numbers of existing At Large Activists can be delivered.
Without that, it cannot support any claim to be fulfilling its core mission
and ultimately will collapse. Focusing on what the ICANN Staff/ Board, will
and will not accept is looking at it the wrong way round. It is simply noise
designed to keep activists busy while Esther handpicks the organizations
that will have the casting votes in each RALO. This is a bad idea, and only
serves to delay ICANN's inevitable demise.

More important, if the RALO's are intended to be decentralized heterarchies,
they would be made up of previously isolated groups that can connect to one
another and coordinate, without any central leader. That's not happening
here, because it would put the At Large in the driving seat and exclude
ICANN until such time as policies had been developed on issues that were
user orientated.

Alternatively, the RALOs would be part of one big hierarchy, namely ICANN,
with top-down structures dictated by very visible leaders. Then we could
expect ICANN Staff to keep a tight grip on RALO's internal processes, to
ensure consistency in how they are run, right down to debating and voting
procedures, which, in a public interest organization, would be based upon a
democratic process, not a dictatorial Board. But that's not the plan either.
Apparently, RALO's are to be decentralized structures that set their own
rules, which may vary from region to region, organization to organization,
some of which may not be democratically run at all.

No, the proposed plan is not either of these, it is to be a hybrid of
hierarchy meets heterarchy, with democratic values nowhere in sight. It
amounts to a shortlist of selected (by ICANN Staff) organizations that will
be permitted to exist as part of the ICANN structure, but only by prior
agreement made with ICANN Staff in the form of an MoU to which neither party
is bound. ICANN has no intention to be the central authority to hold these
RALO's accountable should they not be truly democratic, or their processes
not represent their members adequately, or the treasurer runs off with the
cash, or whatever reason that one may fail. No, it's proposed structure
relies entirely on voluntary cooperation from those invited to the table,
hence the power broking for seats that Esther is overseeing. Business as
usual. This does not inspire confidence that the public interest is being
safeguarded. On the contrary, it points to catastrophic failure of the At
Large, which can be expected to grant block votes to an exclusive club of
hand picked organizations, leaving individuals overshadowed on the sidelines
once again.

To truly defend the public interest, we must understand what drives the
public's interest in the internet, which is the social possibilities of it
all, not the technical stability of the DNS on which it relies. We must also
understand the benefits to be gained from participation and the losses that
may occur should participation be excluded. You may list them, but I will
pick just one illustrative example, to show how deeply the internet affects
people's individual behavior and social stability in general, which as has
been pointed out, is inextricably linked to technical stability, a view even
supported by ICANN Staff. I would point to the use of the DNS as a factor in
co-coordinating the rapidly expanding anti-war campaign that has presented
itself worldwide in recent days and weeks. This has not taken months and
years to evolve as happened in the Vietnam war era, it happened virtually
overnight and is growing daily. Google alone currently has 92,200 results
for a search on anti-war campaign.
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=anti-war+campaign.
Many of these websites popped up in the time it took to say Axis of Evil.
Those responsible for their creation have a vested interest in the technical
stability of their online petitions, protest march schedules, discussion
lists, websites and so on, each of which empower significant change in
social behavior that may be subject to political pressure and shut down.

There's an interesting article on this issue in the NY Times, about how
anti-Iraq war protesters are employing the technology
http://www.politechbot.com/p-04490.html. To oversimplify, the internet
allows the anti-war lobby to stay a step ahead of the US administration in
their planning, which is absolutely strategically central in their ability
to be effective in what they are doing. That represents a demonstrable
public interest that needs to be guarded from undue political pressure, yet
these activists are not centralized organizations with a leader who can turn
up, fully formed at an At Large RALO, ready and willing to sign an MoU. Some
groups may range in size from a handful of individuals to hundreds of
thousand of members. They cannot be categorized by region, their commonality
is their interest in the one issue, stopping the war. Equally this could be
a pro-war organization, the point being, how can issue based organizations
such as these protect their interests? Does any pressure exist to bring the
DNS into line with mainstream media as a government propaganda machine in
times of war? Exactly what opportunities exist within the proposed At Large
Structure to voice these concerns?

Instead of fostering real public participation by throwing the door open to
all groups and individuals, which is the way the At large was originally
intended to be, instead, the ALAC is proposing to draw key players from a
community already dominated by hand picked representatives. The usual
suspects can be expected to cast block votes, in vast numbers, in haste, and
without consulting their membership, if any membership actually exists at
all. Some of these organizations being bandied about are shams.

No doubt, the ability to outvote bothersome individuals is one reason why
ICANN favors organizational membership in the At Large, ones that it
pre-approves, top down. Yet, if I understand this correctly, ICANN will not
be overseeing the internal procedures of any of these external organizations
directly. That means no oversight for ensuring proper democratic procedures
take place within the RALOs, and no enforcement. How easy will it be to
block issues that do not fit with special interest agendas? History has
taught us that issues are blocked repeatedly in the constituency structure,
(Whois Task Force on Privacy) and that it is virtually impossible for an
individual to get a topic onto the agenda without support from a more
powerful special interest group.

In the current vision, ICANN neatly removes itself from any direct
responsibility for an At Large voting process of any kind. Even if any
voting is to take place at all in the RALOs, all procedures would be handled
by external organizations, over which ICANN would have no power. And for
individual members, there is no sign of any financial assistance to set up
formal voting procedures at all. Even this mailing list is a closed list, so
how then will individuals be able to join the At Large directly, raise
issues for worldwide discussion and vote?

If ICANN is not willing to assist with funding the At Large, is not willing
to take any central role in holding online elections, neither in monitoring
the integrity of RALO processes, nor in welcoming all users through the
door, and is not even empowered to enforce any MoU it enters into with an
RALO, then the true value of involving ICANN in At Large formation
is...well... zero.

While the At Large is still generally perceived as crucial, banishing it
altogether is not an option for ICANN. Consequently, the At Large does not
have to agree to such a one-sided agreement and even now, users have the
choice to stand their ground and insist on ICANN support for a more
meaningful At Large Structure.

Regards,
Joanna

>
> I encourage all interested people to participate in the process of
> formation of the RALOs, as it will be in the RALO's Bylaws that these
> issues will be finalized. Our comments to the ERC went in this
> direction - ICANN Bylaws should restate the principle that RALOs are
> to represent individuals, but how to practically obtain this is to
> vary from Region to Region and should be self-decided by the Region
> itself.
> --
> vb.                  [Vittorio Bertola - vb [at] bertola.eu.org]<---
> -------------------> http://bertola.eu.org/ <-----------------------
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