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Re: [wg-c] about the consensus call



On Thu, Mar 16, 2000 at 02:15:04AM -0500, Milton Mueller wrote:
> > I'm coming to wonder, though, whether this vision is limited in a way that
> > I didn't focus on initially.  The advantages that I suggest above for a
> > system in which the initiative comes from applicant registries come into
> > play in connection with *commercial* TLDs.  They're got less value in
> > connection with noncommercial TLDs such as Jamie's .SUCKS.
> 
> This distinction makes no sense to me.
> 
> The idea behind the consensus call is that innovation comes from people who
> are ready, willing and able to execute new ideas. Innovation does not come
> from people who merely suggest or propose, it comes from those who act. It
> matters not at all whether the idea is for making money or not. Jamie's idea
> was for supporting free expression and a free speech foundation, as CPT
> proposed to do with .sucks. But why should Jamie/CPT be given "policy
> authority" over a .sucks TLD merely for stating the idea?

Milton, it would help if you addressed the arguments that were actually
made.  No one has suggested that one gets "policy authority" just by
suggesting a name.  I agree -- that would be lunacy.  A proposal that
delegates policy authority would be evaluated on the basis of the
"delegees" qualifications to act in that capacity.  Characteristics such
as stability, longevity, experience in the policy area, etc would have
to be evaluated -- not an easy task in general, but, for example, the EC
seems eminently qualified to be a policy authority for a .eu TLD.  It
isn't necessary that they already have their registry operator selected
to make the decision as to whether they are a competent policy 
authority. 

> We are having an indirect debate. It's time we made it more explicit.
> Crispin and Crocker want "policy authority" to be separated from registry
> operation because they want all authority over DNS to be centralized in
> ICANN's hands.
[fantasy deleted]
> Some of us view the Internet as a mechanism for coordinating autonomous
> actors of civil society. Others view "Internet" as something that is "owned"
> by a central entity (ICANN) that decides what is "good" for the rest of us.
> This is what the debate is about now.

No, that is not what the debate is about.  The above is an extended
flight of fantasy, where you do mighty battle with demons of your own
creation.  But the demons are most assuredly of your own creation. 

> > But we're still left with Kent's
> > question whether there's any *value* to requiring Jamie to establish such
> a
> > relationship in advance.)
> 
> If they haven't established that relationship, they don't know what they are
> doing. What does such a proposal consist of? How does ICANN select one
> proposer over another? How does it judge competence, the ability to deliver
> what it promises? These questions I raised days ago. They have never been
> answered.

We haven't answered the question of what the technical qualifications
for a registry operator should be, either.  Arguably, any of the 250 
odd current production registries must meet the qualifications, by 
definition.  But that doesn't mean "redundant DS3's".

[...]
> Jon, if we are talking about picking a miniscule number such as 6-10, there
> is no way to limit ICANN's discretion meaningfully, except in a highly
> general way such as the Sheppard/Kleiman principles.
[...]
> The S/K principles set some very broad guidelines. The first new TLDs should
> differentiate, for example. They should not authorize some potentially
> deceptive string. And so on. The principles are good enough for the
> situation. Let's move on!

It amazes me no end that you think that S/K will in any meaningful way 
limit ICANN's discretion.

-- 
Kent Crispin                               "Do good, and you'll be
kent@songbird.com                           lonesome." -- Mark Twain