RE: Useful Comments Re: DNSO process and Drafts submitted to ICANN

["John B. Reynolds" <john@reynolds.chicago.il.us>]

I would have to see the specific wording, but my initial reaction is that
the changes you suggest would largely answer my concerns (although I would
still prefer explicitly defined initial constituencies), along with a
revision to Section 5.9 similar to that suggested by AIP and NSI.

I am not sure that a meld of the two drafts can be achieved without losing
support from key players on each side, nor do I believe that I would be the
best person to try to accomplish it.

Einar Stefferud wrote:
>
> Good constructive and useful criticism as I read it;-)...
>
> >From your message Sun, 7 Feb 1999 10:42:42 -0600:
> }
> }William X. Walsh wrote:
> }
> }> I call for a vote of participants on this list for which draft
> }> they support.
> }>
> }> It is time to vocalize your support, and clearly indicate who you
> }> represent.
> }
> }OK, I'll bite:
> }
> }There are number of problems with the Paris draft.  Section 2.1
> leaves the
> }issue of who is eligible for DNSO membership up to ICANN by making it
> }coextensive with ICANN's membership.  It is not yet clear what
> the makeup of
> }this membership will be or whether it would be appropriate for the DNSO.
> }
>
> I agree with this concern, and I suggest that the initial membership
> be defined in some other more well defined way.  One suggestion that
> makes sense to me is "Anyone with a DNS Zone file to administer" to be
> used to elect an INITIAL Names Council that is defined to have rather
> limited powers to decide on plicy matters, but has lots of power to
> set in motion both Research Committees and Fair Hearing Panels to
> comence the work of sorting out the mess that the DNSO will have to
> resolve.
>
> }
> }Section 3.2 requires the General Assembly to "self-organize into diverse
> }constituencies" without providing any mechanism for doing so.  If
> }discussions on these mailing lists are any indication, this is likely to
> }generate endless squabbles about the proper number and type of
> }constituencies that would likely not be resolved until ICANN
> stepped in to
> }impose a solution.
> }
>
> This is one more reason to start with an Initial NC with limited
> powers as suggested above.
>
> }
> }The real show-stoppers are in Article V, specifically Sections
> 5.8 through
> }5.11.  The "Fair Hearing" provisions of Sections 5.8, 5.10, and
> 5.11 make it
> }possible for any special interest or special interest group to
> delay almost
> }indefinitely any policy that they disagree with.  Section 5.9 goes even
> }further.  It elevates the particular special interest group of registries
> }above all others by giving it veto power and by requiring an essentially
> }unachievable 3/4 supermajority of registries for approval.  These
> }provisions, taken individually and in toto, would make it nearly
> impossible
> }for the DNSO to produce any substantive policy recommendations
> whatsoever.
> }That is unacceptable to me.  It is my hope and expectation that it will
> }prove to be unacceptable to ICANN as well.
> }
>
> Here I am in strong agreement that the whole concept of Fair Hearing
> Panels has been subvertted by inavertant editing whcih converts them
> into a mecahisim to be used to stop progress on any Research Committee
> proposal that someone does not like.  In his us, Fair Hearing Panels
> become a mecahism for objaingin cort-like injunctive relief.
>
> My original concept was tht they would be a method by which DNSO (or
> ICANN) would and could assure fair hearing and thus assure a hearable
> voice to all concerned.  My proposal called for Fair Hearing Panels to
> be created upon a petition to the NC or the BoD, which immediately
> guanatees that the NC or the BoD must read it and act upon it, and
> cannot claim they never knew anything about it.  Thus, guaranteeing
> that any voice can at least be heard.
>
> Behond that, there was no requiremtn that anything or action be
> stopped because of sucha request.  It is my beleif that just exposing
> the call for fair hearing and forcing the issue onto the table will be
> enough to keep things from being done in secret where stakeholders
> find themselves threatened.
>
> This needs further refinement, but I strongly object to the curent use
> of Fair Hearing Panels for providing court like injunctive relief.
> There was never any intention to creat a new court-like system!
>
> }
> }The flaws in the Washington draft are relatively minor by comparison.
> }Business interests are overrepresented, and there is no mechanism for
> }individual users or domain holders to participate directly (Section I.B).
> }It also fails to make clear whether Names Council members are
> elected by the
> }constituencies they represent or by the entire membership
> (Section I.E).  I
> }regard the former approach as necessary to prevent the Names Council from
> }being captured by a special interest group or groups
> constituting a majority
> }of the membership.
> }
>
> So, lets meld the good parts of the "Wahington Draft" into the Paris
> draft and proceed from there.  I suggest that you propose how such new
> or revised text might be applied!
>
> }
> }The Washington draft, however, would create a DNSO that is
> capable of taking
> }action.  For that reason, I support it, albeit as the lesser of
> two evils.
> }
>
> I do not see it as so, but why not try to do a meld?
>
> Cheers...\Stef
>