"constitutional protections"

[Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>]

At the Barcelona meeting Bernard T.  (representing ccTLD interests)
proposed the following numbers for representation of constituencies
on the Governing Committee:


	Registries:  8
	Registrars:  3
	Network connectivity etc:  3
	Commercial users:  2
	Trademark interests:  0 (ex officio standing committee)
	At large:  3

The primary motivation for the obvious unbalance expressed in
Bernard's proposal, as he expressed it, is a fear that the competing
interests would essentially gang up on the registries.  That is, (to 
put it in egocentric terms) the intent of having such a large
representation is not my desire to control others, but rather my fear
what the others might do to me.  

The problem identified here is commonly known as "the tyranny of the 
majority".  It is the major problem with popular democracy.

Bernard said that an alternative that would perhaps be acceptable
would be to have a smaller representation, but to also have some kind
guarantees built in that that would prevent the majority from
running roughshod over registry interests.  These guarantees might 
be called "constitutional protections (CPs)".

There are several substantial advantages to a CP model.  CPs are:

  - Well-modulated: CPs can be constructed to exactly fit the issues
  of interest to a particular constituency. 

  - Not a zero sum game: protecting constituencies by adjusting
  representation is intrinsically zero-sum -- every representational
  unit added is a unit subtracted from someone else.  Adding
  constitutional protections for one group, on the other hand, doesn't
  necessarly reduce the power of another group. 

  - Flexible: There are mechanisms for changing CPs -- super 
  majority votes, and so on.  These mechanisms are much more 
  difficult to engage than usual decision making processes, and are 
  seldom employed.  But they are available in the case where there 
  is very widespread agreement that something needs to be changed.

There are a couple or relatively minor disadvantages to a CP model.

  - First, it enables what has been called "the tyranny of the
  minority", where, through the power granted by a CP, a minority
  blocks some change that a large majority wants.  For example, if,
  through a CP, a constituency were given a veto power on budget
  decisions, that constituency could hold the rest of the
  organization hostage and get its way in matters not related to
  budgets.  This problem can sometimes be dealt with by careful
  construction of the CPs, but probably cannot be totally eliminated. 

  - Second, a CP model adds complexity to the decision process --
  perhaps a lot of complexity.  Without a CP you take a vote, and if
  the vote meets the quorum and majority requirements, the decision
  is made.  But CP's require enforcement and interpretation, and this
  additional mechanism could be considerable. 

On balance, however, the advantages seem to me to far outweigh the
disadvantages, so I would like to propose that we work from the
premise that we will have a CP model.  More than that, I would argue 
that some form of CP model is actually inevitable, and we would 
probably be better off starting with that explicitly in mind. (*)

Presuming that we start from a CP model, I would further propose that
we adopt a "constituency-blind" representational model, where every
constituency gets the same number of seats. 

Concretely:

	Registries: 2
	Registrars: 2
	Network connectivity etc: 2
	Commercial users: 2 
	Trademark interests: 2
	At large: 9

Each of the 5 defined constituencies will potentially have a set of
CPs associated with them -- certain issues about which they have
special powers or protections.  The apparent unbalance with the At
Large group is really an illusion -- the At Large group represents
every other possible constituency, but at the same time has NO
specific CPs (**) associated with it -- it can't, because, by
definition, it doesn't represent any *particular* constituency. 
Furthermore, the At Large group is large enough so that meaningful
geographical constraints can be applied. 

This model hinges on the Constitutional Protections involved.  If we
decide to go this route, the debate should shift from the "number of
representatives" to "what special rights and powers should be assigned
to each constituency". 

This would, in my opinion, be a healthy development.  It would force 
us to look at specific policy areas and concerns, and take us away 
from thinking in terms of power politics.

-------------------------

(*) It is inevitable because, when you think about it, very 
unbalanced representational models create a strong force for some 
kind of guarantees for the rights of those not so well represented.

(**) There may be general CPs that apply to every member, regardless 
of further membership in a constituency.


-- 
Kent Crispin, PAB Chair			"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
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