Re: [ga] iCANN's consensus by exclusion

["Patrick Corliss" <patrick@quad.net.au>]

Hi Jefsey

Would you mind re-posting the following to [ga-ext] External Relations which
has been set up especially to examine the consensus process?

I appreciate your views and would like to see them included in the relevant
debate.  This is perhaps best achieved by selecting the most appropriate
forum ;-)

Thank you.
Patrick Corliss


----- Original Message -----
From: Jefsey Morfin <jefsey@wanadoo.fr>
To: <ga@dnso.org>
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2001 7:14 PM
Subject: [ga] iCANN's consensus by exclusion


Dear Harald,

What you mean is the DNSO does not contribute with enough value, so we
should get rid of it.
What is certainly what Staff and some BoD are attempting.
 > On 10:24 30/04/01, Harald Tveit Alvestrand said:
 > In normal corporate activity, cost centers that do not contribute
appropriate value to the
 > effective function of the corporation are shut down; benefit to the
world outside the corporation > is normally not considered.
 > I do not think we want to encourage normal corporate procedures here.

I am afraid you just miss one point: without the DNSO/GA and the @large,
the iCANN has not the legal basis to exist.   iCANN has only been set-up to
manage consensus areas and to preserve TM name space stability. In trying
to preserve TM name space stability trough an increase of TM privileges it
meets conflicts it tries to solve in obtaining consensuses by exclusion.

This exclusion policy only makes sense if the excluding parties are
powerfull enough and solidly tight together: hence the Plan B to create a
duopoly with VeriSign and the TLD/ccTLD contracts to tight TLDs together in
a very complex system. The problem is all this is purely artificial and
will not hold for long confronted to any serious inclusive policy
(inclusive means everyone: iCANN included) : inclusive name space,
inclusive DNS with MultiBind, inclusive international understanding at the
GAC, inclusive development technology, necessary inclusive legal system,
even inclusive TM protection policy [as a small TM holder I am not happy
with the WIPO approach], etc....

I suppose that you personnaly defend the statu quo by desire of network
stability and I do respect that (I have exactly the same concern). But
while you seem to think that stability is by statu quo; I think that this
statu quo is the factor of instability unless we may have the iCANN
reformed (and not replaced or suppressed).

Nobody serious wants the disapearance of the iCANN, but how do you want an
unbalanced duopoly between Staff and VeriSign where Staff has no
legitimacy, nor funding (except the .org revenue) and a dwindling number of
allies and flock (look at China) to stay very long. This is mad house.

The only solution is to revise the iCANN in the way it should have been
set: in making it the Association of the Internet Communities, ie the
stability at its roots. This means a secretariat for the IP and the DNS+
matters supporting dialog on netwide interests through the DNSO and the ASO
and dialong about stakeholders' interests though the @large. And a funding
through the TLDs turn over (not on DNs as we have to consider free TLDs and
new forms of TLDs, since I suppose your desire of statu quo does not
opposes innovation).

Cheers.
Jefsey

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