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Re: [wg-review] Proposal draft (Part 1)


This is a terrific job! Thanks for getting this going. I have one suggestion, which is bracketed as the last sentence.
 

 Recommendation:  In light of the confusion and lack of reference with regards to what constitutes a “consensus” mechanism in the DNSO, the formal adoption of a standard 2/3 definition of “consensus” is recommended.  This 2/3 formula is proposed as a standard for the purposes of research or drafting  committees, working groups and other bodies of the GA, and should be based on the number of participants voting within the respective groups.  In other words, assuming that there are 40 members on a given list and only 30 exercise their right to vote, then 20 would be considered a “consensus”.  In the event of someone not agreeing with the options provided for in a vote ballot, an abstention option should also be mandated for any ballot, which option establishes participation in the voting process without committing to any of the other alternatives. In this way, a clear distinction between abstaining and not voting is established. [In addition, since a "consensus" of opinion should reflect more than just the recorded outcome of the view of the (super)majority, a written record of dissenting views should be included in any formal recommendation receiving at least 2/3 but less than unanimous support.]

 

Rod

 

 

Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2001 3:03 AM
Subject: [wg-review] Proposal draft (Part 1)

 Dear All,
 
I am posting a first part of the proposal draft for your perusal and comments.  The hour is late, and I am tired.  I will post the rest on the morrow.
 
Sincerely,
 
Sotiris Sotiropoulos
        Working Chair WG-Review

Preface 

This document is not intended to reflect a set of consensus-based policy recommendations founded on unanimous compromise between all active participants within the WG-Review.  Nor does it reflect a consensus defined in terms of a 2/3 formulation based on the number of participants in a vote.  Instead, the origin of this report lies in the generally unanimous acknowledgement of problems within the current Domain Name Support Organization (“DNSO”), with respect to its conception as outlined in ARTICLE VI-B of the ICANN Bylaws.  Estimates of the degree of impairment of the DNSO among members of WGr vary, but broadly speaking, a general consensus largely cedes the problematic character of the body to some extent.  Indeed, the very issuance of the ICANN Board of Directors’ Resolutions 01.28 and 01.29* verifies the Board’s (“BoD”) assessment of the deficient nature of the DNSO, and underscores the need for substantive proposals and recommendations for remedying any identified shortcomings or flaws in the DNSO.  As a result, this paper will include proposals by members of the WGr with respect to certain perceived DNSO problem areas, and is therefore not intended as an exhaustive or adequate reflection of the WGr as a whole.  

 *Resolutions of the BoD as mentioned above:

 [Resolution 01.28] The Board asks the Names Council and other sources to separate their proposals into those that improve operations of the DNSO as it is constituted today and those which may result in changes in the structure of the DNSO and/or major changes in its functioning.

[Resolution 01.29] The Board encourages input related to changes that improve operations of the DNSO as it is constituted today no later than April 16, 2001. Further Board action on the basis of that input will be scheduled at the end of that period."

 Terms of Reference 

For the purposes of this report, let it be noted that the Board is understood to be requesting two distinct categories of proposals.  In the first instance, there is a request for proposals/recommendations that improve operations of the DNSO as it is constituted today.  This category of proposals appears to reflect the need for a temporary `quick fix’ for short-term purposes only.  Secondly, the Board is understood as further requesting proposals/recommendations, which may result in changes in the structure and process of the DNSO and/or involve major changes in its overall function for the long-term. 

DNSO  

The DNSO is responsible for advising the ICANN Board with respect to policy issues relating to the Domain Name System.  The DNSO currently consists of (i) a Names Council ("NC"), consisting of representatives of constituencies as elected by the “Constituencies” described in Section 3 of ICANN Bylaws Article VI-B ("Constituencies"), and (ii) a General Assembly ("GA"), consisting of all interested individuals and entities.  It is important to note that the GA includes, but is not limited to the established “Constituencies” of the DNSO.

 Issues and Recommendations

 A) Consensus Management 

Responsibilities of the NC include the management of the consensus building process within the DNSO.  The NC is required to adopt such procedures and policies as it sees fit to carry out that responsibility, including the designation of such research or drafting committees, working groups and other bodies of the GA as it determines are appropriate to carry out the substantive work of the DNSO. 

 With respect to the NC management and oversight of the consensus building process of the current DNSO, it has been generally remarked that there is no clearly defined consensus mechanism, thereby resulting in confusion, frustration and disappointment for many members of the various groups and entities subsumed/mandated within the GA.  One clear example of this contention among the membership of the WGr is the following comment:

“One of the central problems with the consensus building process -- and we discussed this issue in WG-D with no resolution -- is the fact that there is no mechanism that encourages any party to compromise. 

What we've seen in the DNSO to date are various interest groups putting forth party-line positions to the WGs, the NC, and the Board. There has been virtually no attempt to forge consensus or seek compromise among the participants themselves. While the NC and Board are supposed to "recognize" consensus among the participants, they have too often been left to act as judge of how best to balance competing interests. 

When the Board or NC judges the merits of competing proposals, it only compounds the problem. The participants quickly learn that they need not speak directly to those who oppose them -- only to those who will judge them. Position papers have become the end product, not the starting points for a dialogue about how to reach compromise. 

In the current structure, there is really no one to *broker* a compromise.      "Peacemaking" is time-intensive work. Who is going to run shuttle diplomacy among the various constituencies and interested parties, honing draft policies until they really reflect a consensus? Is that the WG Chair's responsibility? The NCs? Is it unrealistic to expect volunteer participants to shoulder this task? 

It's also not clear that there is any incentive for some to compromise, even if we solved the problems noted above. In other industry self-regulatory schemes, there is the threat of unilateral action by the government regulator if the community does not take some action. The resulting uncertainty about what the regulator may do prompts the community to come together to present a consensus position. 

In our case, however, ICANN cannot act absent community consensus. This removes the threat of unilateral regulatory intervention in its entirety.  Those who benefit from maintaining the status quo have absolutely no incentive to compromise, ever.”

 -Original Submission by WGr member Brett Faussett:

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00116.html

-For supplemental references on this topic see:

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00124.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00198.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00581.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00645.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg01952.html

 There are many more examples of evident confusion as to the nature of “consensus” within the current DNSO as managed by the existing NC model, and these can be made available upon request.  For the purposes of a short-term remedy to the problem, the following recommendation is based on the existing mechanism for determining community consensus within the current Names Council itself (see Subsection D of Section 2, ARTICLE VI-B, ICANN Bylaws).

 Recommendation:  In light of the confusion and lack of reference with regards to what constitutes a “consensus” mechanism in the DNSO, the formal adoption of a standard 2/3 definition of “consensus” is recommended.  This 2/3 formula is proposed as a standard for the purposes of research or drafting  committees, working groups and other bodies of the GA, and should be based on the number of participants voting within the respective groups.  In other words, assuming that there are 40 members on a given list and only 30 exercise their right to vote, then 20 would be considered a “consensus”.  In the event of someone not agreeing with the options provided for in a vote ballot, an abstention option should also be mandated for any ballot, which option establishes participation in the voting process without committing to any of the other alternatives. In this way, a clear distinction between abstaining and not voting is established.

 B) Staffing/Secretariat:

 

To date the NC (and the GA generally), have relied mostly on volunteerism for the production, organization, collation, and distribution of all pertinent documentation and other information relevant to the DNSO as a whole.  A concern of many of the members of WGr is the resulting inefficiency with regards to the easy accessibility/availability and distribution of documents/ information pertaining to the various purposes, processes, procedures and programs of the NC, and the DNSO in general.  Also, concern has been expressed over a perceived lack of responsiveness to general inquiries, and other requests for information and/or (re)production of relevant material(s) and/or media.  The following comment is a good example of such sentiment: 

"Motion:  The number and the complexity of the various printed and electronic documents the NC must produce and archive has been identified as one of the difficulties in relating and therefore to reaching a consensus with or through the NC. The WG-Review therefore requests that the NC elects a Secretary among its Members, as usually do the public bodies. His/Her duties will include supervising the Scribe and the Staff secretariat on behalf of the NC, verifying that a consistent and clear Subject composition system is respected for an easy retrieval of the archives. No NC document will take effect without a prior final approval of the Secretary signified by a leading mention in the Subject.  For the same reasons it is strongly recommended that the same system is adopted all over the ICANN. ICANN bylaws will be modified as appropriate to accommodate this motion."

 -Original Submission by WGr member Jefsey Morfin:

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg01075.html

-For supplemental references on this topic see:

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00716.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00719.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg00747.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg01098.html

http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-review/Arc02/msg03188.html 

Generally speaking, there was a good deal of support for a dedicated and smooth functioning secretariat for the DNSO among the WGr membership.  Indeed, such a department is a key component in the successful functioning of any organization, and the lack of it within the DNSO should be viewed as a serious flaw. 

 Recommendation:  For the purposes of effective ministration of the DNSO as a whole, it is proposed that a general secretariat be established to serve both the GA and the NC respectively.  This secretariat is not to be confused or related to the internal secretariat structures of the various bodies or entities (such as Constituencies) that make up the GA as a whole.  Rather, the DNSO secretariat will serve the purposes of organizing and responding to the information needs and requirements of the DNSO as a whole.  For the purposes of timeliness, quality, and appropriateness of any such efforts, it is recommended that the secretariat be founded on a professional rather than volunteer basis.  A proposal and budget for such a secretariat should be a priority for the Board with respect to the establishment of a consistent and smooth functioning DNSO, and it is recommended that this suggestion be implemented as soon as possible, as it will serve the interests of both short and long-term remedial programs.

*******************End of Part 1



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