RE: [nc-review] testing/starting..

[Elisabeth Porteneuve <Elisabeth.Porteneuve@cetp.ipsl.fr>]

I would like to add the following questions for consideration
by the Review Committee:
  - Do the Constituencies communicate with their NC reps ?
    Are NC reps discussing with Constituencies members ?
    Reporting to them ? Considering Constituencies input ?
  - Is it up to each Constituency to define its relationship with
    NC reps or shall DNSO (ICANN) have some minimal mandatory
    requirements for all ?
  - What happen if an elected NC rep does not attend NC meetings,
    ignore his Constituency members and does not resign ?
    What if an elected NC rep publicly considers that ICANN process
    and DNSO structure are of no interest and is acting against 
    both of them ?
  - Some Constituencies rely on ICANN definition for its membership
    (I believe Registrars shall be accredited ICANN Registrars,
    ccTLD shall be as those in IANA database, gTLDs the same, etc),
    and therefore rely on more or less strong day-to-day relationship
    with ICANN staff. Whereas Registrars or gTLDs are well taken
    care of, IMHO this is not a case of ccTLDs, the inhomogenous
    international group representing 190 sovereign nations and its
    50+ territories. How to improve this situation ?
  - All 3 Constituencies quoted above are or shall
    be ICANN financial contributors (90% of all ICANN budget, the
    remaining 10% is from IP registries), and their part was 
    determined by more or less unknown method.
    Whereas I learned from various conversations that the
    ratio of contributions between Domain Names and IP Numbers should
    converge to 50%-50%, is there a point of rendez-vous between
    SO's to discuss that matters ?
  - I had a small conversation with Joe Sims in Yokohama inquiring
    about international staff at ICANN offices (one of my reationship
    applied for ICANN staff position, with a wonderfull CV and
    work record, a real loss if he leaves France,
    and never got anything else that acknowledge of his application);
    Joe told me that whatever wishes we may have, there is almost
    no possibility to get working permit in the US for ICANN staff.
    If it is the case, how it can be changed ? Either a special
    status for ICANN or establishing ICANN offices abroad ?
    With 158,000 AtLarge Members, 60% of them in non-English speaking Asia
    (China-Japan-Taiwan-Korea), ICANN seems to please and its
    membership will grow. Therefore envisaging to establish offices
    aboroad is, IMHO the right direction. Basically, it is hardly
    acceptable to have any Ford car provided it is a black one
    (I am not sure I quote it correctly ...).


Best regards,
Elisabeth


-----Original Message-----
From owner-nc-review@dnso.org Thu Aug 17 13:02 MET 2000
Message-ID: <8F85256EF0B0D31184960000D1ECCDBD01C91200@netsol-nic-ex04.prod.netsol.com>
From: "Cochetti, Roger" <rogerc@netsol.com>
To: "'R.Gaetano@iaea.org'" <R.Gaetano@iaea.org>, Theresa.Swinehart@wcom.com,
        nc-review@dnso.org
Subject: RE: [nc-review] testing/starting..
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2000 07:02:19 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0

I agree with Roberto's general concern, expressed at the end of his note,
and  -because it is so basic-  think it deserves some attention by the group
early in the process:  I suspect that most people involved in the design of
the ICANN structure presumed that the SO's  (including most notably the
DNSO) would be the source of expertise and detailed management activity for
the Corporation and that the Corporate Board would be the generalist body
that integrates the expert work of the three SO's Councils.  In fact, for
whatever reasons, the opposite has happened:  the DNSO's Council has evolved
into the generalist body and the Corporate Board the specific, detailed,
group.

This may be either inevitable or for the best; but it is not what was
expected by most people before ICANN was set up.  And how you view the
proper relationship between the DNSO Council and the Corporate Board does
have a powerful impact on how you think the NC should be structured.

So I think we should have an early review of the proper expectations for the
Names Council and then we can conclude on any implications that those
expectations have for NC structure, etc.  

In conducting such a review, I would volunteer that I do not think there is
a correct and an incorrect answer to the question "How much or little should
the NC be involved in the detailed management of ICANN?"   Like the question
"Are diversified companies best managed under a centralized or a
de-centralized structure?", this becomes a matter of both opinion in general
and opinion related to the exact circumstances at the time.  So I don't
think that having a review of the proper role for the NC vs the ICANN Board
means that we must come to a conclusion about it; only that we should review
the subject before evaluating the NC's performance and options for the
future.

-----Original Message-----
From: R.Gaetano@iaea.org [mailto:R.Gaetano@iaea.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2000 3:26 AM
To: Theresa.Swinehart@wcom.com; nc-review@dnso.org
Subject: RE: [nc-review] testing/starting..


Hi.

I have no comments on the introductory part (snipped), but some points to
add to the WG's shopping list.

> **********************************
> 
> DRAFT Outline for the DNSO Review
> 
> Introduction:
> 
> .........
> 
> 
> Identify what responsibilities the DNSO has had to date 
> consistent with its
> mandate [TO BE ADDED]
> 
> * To what extent has the DNSO fulfilled these responsibilities?
> 
> * Where was the DNSO lacking in its capacity?
> 
> * Does the DNSO performance require improvement, and if so, how?
> 
> Structure:
> 
> The current structure of the DNSO is as follows: The NC, Seven
> constituencies, and the General Assembly [TO BE ADDED] provide short
> overview of these structures].
> 
> * Does the existing structure work?
> 
> * If not, can it be improved?


* Are the responsibilities of the components (NC, Constituencies, GA) and
the relationship among them well defined?


> 
> * Are the constituencies a correct division? Should there be different
> divisions in the DNSO? E.g., users v. providers?
> 
> * Does the current constituency division minimize the 
> effectiveness of the
> DNSO and NC?
> 
> * Are the constituencies adequately representing the intended group?
> 


Are the constituencies reasonably well covering all areas of interest (in
other words, is there any important part of the Internet Community that may
need better representation)?


> * The GA has improve subsequently to the elections of the 
> chairs -- what
> should be the future responsibilities of the GA be?

Thanks ;>)

> 
> 
> Review  [Additional points to be added]:
> 
> * To improve the effectiveness of the DNSO, should the 
> structure change? if
> so, how?
> 
> * Have the DNSO recommendations furthered the ICANN work 
> consistent with the
> provision in Article III, Section 3, oftheICANN Bylaws, that 
> the ICANN Board
> shall accept recommendations of the DNSO if the Board finds that the
> recommended policy (1) furthers the purposes of, and is in 
> the best interest
> of, the Corporation; (2) is consistent with the Articles and 
> Bylaws; (3) was
> arrived at through fair and open processes (including participation by
> representatives of other Supporting Organizations if 
> requested); and (4)
> isn't reasonably opposed by any other Supporting Organization.
> 


I have a comment here, that I am unable to translate in specific points for
discussion.
I am unhappy about the way that the DNSO (globally) has dealt with the
question of the introduction of the new TLDs.
Without entering into the merit of the recommendation, I found the
recommendation "in itself" to be *weak*, sort of "letting the Board decide
because there's no clear consensus".
This is unsatisfactory to me, and may underline a difference of opinion in
the role of the DNSO, that we may want to include as point for the charter
of the WG.
IMHO, the DNSO should summarize *the expertise* about Domain Names.
In principle, the Board will not have any additional *expertise* other than
the ability to combine the recommandation and comments from the different
SOs, and considerations of global nature and/or global policy.
To interpret the role of the DNSO as "purely technical", with a political
synthesis to be done at the Board level is *wrong*.
We have in the DNSO the representation of all interest. If the DNSO itself
is unable to come with clear proposals taking into account (and mediating
among) the interests of Registrars, Registries, Trademarks, Business,
NonCom, and so on, who should?
It is correct that the NC had to "interpret" the outcome of the WGs, and
determine whether that outcome represented consensus, but IMHO the NC should
have made an additional effort to come to a better defined recommandation.

Simply put, I believe that the ultimate authority lays with ICANN's Board,
but that the Board will be happy to delegate powers (or authority)
specifically relevant to the DNS *if the DNSO shows that it is able to make
decisions*. The more we answer "I don't know, you decide" to the question
"What do you recommend", the less inclined will be the ICANN Board to even
bother asking.

Is this worth addressing in the WG, or not?

Regards
Roberto