[ga] FYI: European Council guidelines on ICANN Reform

[Alexander Svensson <alexander@svensson.de>]

[These were adopted by the EU Council of Telecommunications 
 ministers -- from a posting by Christopher Wilkinson on the
 ec-pop mailing list. /// Alexander]

>GUIDELINES FOR DISCUSSIONS
>
>1. The ICANN Mission
>
>ICANN should have a clearly defined, limited and stable mission, giving 
>priority to technical functions that are essential for the coordination 
>and stability of the Internet. Certain existing activities could be 
>reduced to improve that focus. Relevant legal and contractual work 
>should be reduced to what is essential.
>
>  The agreed definition should be adopted and revised by the Board 
>by a substantial majority, after a GAC opinion. 
>
>  Bottom-up participation, transparency and consensus building 
>should continue to be guiding principles of ICANNīs working methods. 
>Excessive and unnecessary centralisation within ICANN processes should 
>be avoided.
>
>In many cases, ICANN's mission impinges on public policy issues. In these 
>cases GAC must play a stronger role in the decision making process (see 
>point 4 below).
>
>2.  The Public-Private Partnership
>
>The open public-private partnership, involving ICANN, governments and 
>stakeholders in the Domain Name System (DNS), needs to be clarified. 
>
>Government involvement with ICANN processes, which in areas impinging on 
>public policy needs to be strengthened, should be through an enhanced 
>relationship between ICANN and the GAC rather than through direct 
>participation in ICANN's Board and Budget.
>
>  Governments should satisfy themselves that the interests of other 
>appropriate stakeholders are adequately recognised in the final structure. 
>
>3.  ICANN structure, membership and financing
>
>  The private sector participants concerned are responsible for 
>reaching mutually acceptable agreements regarding the structure of ICANN, 
>its membership and financing and its decision-making processes. Due 
>consideration should be given to the adequate protection of the public 
>interest by strengthening the standing of GAC Advice.
>
>  Such agreements, however, must give full weight to 
>internationalisation, transparency and fairness and to maintaining the 
>principle of geographic diversity and representation throughout the 
>organisation. These agreements should be defined in such a way that the 
>legitimate interests of each area of the world, and of their respective 
>stakeholders, whether economic, legal or pertaining to public policies, 
>could be duly taken into account.
>
>  Governments should not contribute directly to ICANN's budget. 
>
>4.  Treatment of public policy issues
>
>  Governments are responsible for public policy, not ICANN. Where ICANN's 
>activities are likely to involve public policy implications, ICANN must 
>consult the GAC. The GAC and ICANN should seek to define in advance which 
>areas involve such implications. When there is an ICANN Board majority 
>against a GAC advice, the matter must be further discussed in good faith 
>between the ICANN Board and the GAC, with a view to reaching an 
>agreement. Decisions taken by the ICANN Board against a GAC advice do 
>not prejudice any steps governments may decide to take in order to 
>protect the public interest. In all cases, ICANN should inform GAC on 
>how its advice has been taken into account.
>
>5.  The Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC)
>
>Governments agree that the GAC is the principal forum for the 
>international discussion of public policy issues related to the ICANN 
>mission and the Domain Name System. In this respect, Governments attach 
>great importance to strengthening the role of GAC and ensuring its 
>functional independence, in particular in the context of its partnership 
>with ICANN.
>
>  In order to effectively fulfil this role vis-ā-vis ICANN, GAC needs to 
>work more effectively and be better integrated into the policy formulation 
>process. This will require the necessary organisation and secretariat and
>in due course, if needed, a more appropriate legal structure. Governments
>should provide the necessary resources to this effect. In anticipation
>that other administrations will also make available such resources, the
>European Commission is also encouraged to allocate appropriate resources
>for this purpose. Responsibility for the GAC secretariat could thus be
>shared between several GAC participants. This secretariat would provide
>services to GAC both for policy making and logistics.
>
>  GAC may seek the assistance of other qualified international entities 
>for specific tasks or projects. 
>
>6.  Oversight of the Root Zone File and Reserve Powers
>
>  The important issue of the transfer of powers relating to the management 
>of the root server system from the United States' Department of Commerce 
>to ICANN, under appropriate supervision, remains unresolved. Governments, 
>in cooperation with the stakeholders concerned, should work towards 
>internationalising the oversight role currently exercised by the United 
>States government. The European Union should maintain a close political 
>dialogue with the United States administration in order to facilitate an 
>internationally acceptable outcome. 
>
>  In future reserve powers of last resort in the event of ICANN 
>failing to fulfil its essential tasks and for the oversight of the 
>maintenance of the authoritative Root Zone File could be exercised through 
>the GAC or another appropriately constituted entity. 
>
>Luxembourg, 18 June 2002

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