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RE: [ga] Final draft of proposed mailing list rules
Which is much appreciated. I would hate to see anyone bash Andrew for fronting
up with honest views on how he sees things.
Having ICANN staff directly interact makes the list much more meaningful.
> They're my personal views. I'm trying to take Michael's suggestion to
> involve myself a bit more in the lists.
> [ -----Original Message-----
> [ From: Mark Measday [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org]
> [ Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2000 2:05 PM
> [ To: email@example.com
> [ Cc: Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law; Kent Crispin; firstname.lastname@example.org
> [ Subject: Re: [ga] Final draft of proposed mailing list rules
> [ Andrew,
> [ Could you clarify whether these are personal thoughts, represent
> [ the general thinking of the Board, or should be understood some other way?
> [ Andrew McLaughlin wrote:
> [ > Some thoughts on your thoughts:
> [ >
> [ > [ In my defense, I'd point out that since ICANN has yet to actually do
> [ > [ anything to have a membership except make future membership
> [ less important
> [ > [ and less attractive than in the original schema used to claim
> [ consensus
> [ > [ for the ICANN structure, the DNSO-GA is currently the only
> [ forum in which
> [ > [ individuals who might someday become "members" can participate it has
> [ > [ functioned as a sort of proxy, or stalking horse, for the membership.
> [ >
> [ > That's silly, and it betrays a serious misunderstanding of what
> [ ICANN is and
> [ > how it's supposed to function.
> [ >
> [ > 1. ICANN has been working aggressively to implement a
> [ membership. ICANN
> [ > pursued funds from a number of sources over many months, and obtained
> [ > $200,000 in grant funding from the Markle Foundation; has
> [ hired a full-time
> [ > project manager, a coding team, and a design firm; has purchased and
> [ > installed the necessary machines; and is working to design,
> [ build, and test
> [ > the various hardware and software components of a robust,
> [ fraud-resistant
> [ > at-large membership.
> [ >
> [ > 2. As a bottom-up policy-making body, ICANN relies on a distributed
> [ > architecture for the development of policy recommendations.
> [ There are lots
> [ > of places in addition to the DNSO-GA where individuals who might someday
> [ > become members can participate. A few examples: the ASO
> [ > <http://www.aso.icann.org>, operates two open mailing lists on address
> [ > policy. ARIN, RIPE NCC, and APNIC all feature open policy meetings and
> [ > discussion lists -- see, for example,
> [ > <http://www.apnic.net/general.html#mailing-lists>. The IETF's
> [ POISSON and
> [ > DNS-Ops working groups sometimes touch on technical issues
> [ relevant to ICANN
> [ > policy questions. There are BoFs at conferences like NANOG,
> [ APRICOT, INET,
> [ > IETF, etc., etc.
> [ >
> [ > To me, the DNSO-GA mailing list has thus far demostrated that free-form,
> [ > unfocused discussions add little to the development of consensus on
> [ > technical coordination policies. I have a great deal of confidence that
> [ > Roberto and Harald and others will be able to significantly upgrade the
> [ > performance and value of the DNSO-GA. But I don't think you should look
> [ > toward ICANN's At Large Membership as a substitute for the distributed
> [ > nature of a bottom-up organization -- the real work toward building
> [ > consensus should take place in the RIRs, SDOs, constituencies, working
> [ > groups, etc., and not in large, undifferentiated, aggregated
> [ mailing lists.
> [ >
> [ > I hope that ICANN's at-large membership will help connect
> [ interested persons
> [ > with the existing organizations and forums where consensus
> [ policies will be
> [ > developed and discussed. But I don't think ICANN should ever try to
> [ > substitute for or compete with existing technical
> [ standard-setting and other
> [ > organizations.
> [ >
> [ > I certainly recognize that ICANN's comment interfaces have left
> [ something to
> [ > be desired. We're shortly going to be launching some improved web-based
> [ > forums in which interested persons can submit comments and
> [ discuss pending
> [ > issues (the ad hoc group on numbering will use one of these).
> [ >
> [ > [ In particular, the decision to rewrite the ByLaws in order not to have
> [ > [ individual "members" of any legally or politi
> cally meaningful
> [ sort flies
> [ > [ directly in the face of the very consensus ICANN proclaimed
> [ supported its
> [ > [ initial structure, and represents a decisive break with the
> [ White Paper
> [ > [ vision that provided ICANN's original claim to legitimacy.
> [ Furthermore,
> [ > [ as described in some detail in
> [ > [ http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/individuals.htm, ICANN's
> [ decision to remove
> [ > [ the members-with-meaning was originally justified on a very dubious
> [ > [ reading of California law, and was directly contrary to the
> [ staff report
> [ > [ which appeared to be the main document on the subject (it did
> [ appear in a
> [ > [ separate report which neither I nor many others following the subject
> [ > [ appear to have read until it was too late, since it only appeared in
> [ > [ August while we were on vacation).
> [ >
> [ > First, I think you mischaracterize the White Paper, which
> [ stated that "Board
> [ > Members should be elected from membership or other associations
> [ open to all
> [ > or through other mechanisms that ensure broad representation and
> [ > participation in the election process." The articulated standards are
> [ > openness, broad representation, and participation. ICANN's
> [ current At Large
> [ > Membership plan is open to anyone who wants to join, without charge. We
> [ > hope to make the membership globally representative through extensive
> [ > outreach and recruitment. Any member will be able to participate in the
> [ > election process. And through the membership, we hope to
> [ facilitate greater
> [ > participation in the ICANN Supporting Organizations and their
> [ constituents.
> [ >
> [ > Second, I'm not sure what the reference to the staff report
> [ means. I wrote
> [ > one of the two staff reports on membership, outlining one proposed
> [ > membership structure. After extensive discussion in Santiago
> [ (both formal
> [ > and informal), the Board adopted a different model. The staff
> [ report was
> [ > one input to the Board, along with numerous others from the
> [ community. On
> [ > the question of statutory vs. non-statutory membership, the Board placed
> [ > greater weight on the views advanced by the Membership Advisory
> [ Committee,
> [ > which recommended strongly against statutory membership under California
> [ > corporate law.
> [ >
> [ > I'm sorry that ICANN's August meetings didn't mesh well with
> [ your vacation
> [ > schedule.
> [ >
> [ > [
> [ > [ I also continue to believe it is unfair to have the members' directors
> [ > [ elected in stages while allowing the other directors to be
> [ elected in one
> [ > [ stage. This seems calculated - yes calculated - to minimize
> [ the influence
> [ > [ of the individual directors for as long as possible.
> [ >
> [ > This strikes me as an odd paranoia. ICANN has been entrusted
> [ with ensuring the stability of a few key technical resources for
> [ the Internet. As such, ICANN has to merit confidence in the many
> [ communities of individuals, businesses, universities, and others
> [ that depend upon the Internet that it will not be captured by
> [ crazy people through an untested, unprecedented global election
> [ scheme. The objective of staged elections is to test the
> [ election system in a real-world setting, giving the ICANN
> [ community a chance to observe the process and the results, make
> [ improvements before the next round, or (if things have gone
> [ horribly awry) reboot the whole process. Better to catch and
> [ correct efforts at fraud and capture before all nine At-Large
> [ directors have been seated on the Board.
> [ >
> [ > Your language here is revealing -- you describe the At-Large
> [ directors as "individual directors," as though the nine
> [ SO-elected Directors were something other than individuals. As
> [ you know, all ICANN Directors bear a fiduciary obligation to
> [ ICANN to act in its best interests, not in the best interests of
> [ the organizations for which they work or by which they were
> [ chosen for the Board. This will be true for the At-Large
> [ Directors as well. All 19 Directors are "individuals."
> [ >
> [ > In general, I'm glad that I don't live in the gnostic world
> [ which you seem to occupy, surrounded by devious fiends of
> [ unsleeping malevolence (and their willing dupes), who are out to
> [ entrench powerful oligarchs and betray the cherished notion of
> [ "internet governance." From my perspective, the ICANN world is
> [ largely (though not entirely) populated by individuals of good
> [ will and honorable intention who want to work together to build a
> [ stable, robust, limited-purpose technical coordination entity
> [ that serves the interests of the global Internet community.
> [ (Yes, even your apparent nemesis Joe Sims.) If you approached
> [ the process in this way, your views might be accorded greater
> [ respect by the broader community of participants.
> [ >
> [ > [ All that, however, is past, unless there is some chance the issues
> [ > [ can be revisited in Cairo now that part of the Board is the
> [ > [ elected representeatives of part of the stakeholders?
> [ > [
> [ >
> [ > The whole point of the At Large membership and elections agenda
> [ item for Cairo is to revisit and reconsider these issues. This
> [ is still, as it has been from the beginning, a step-by-step
> [ process forward, often in fits and starts. I'm certainly going
> [ to advise the Board to reach closure on the form
> [ > , structure, and content of At Large membership. What's your alternative
> [ > proposal to what's already in the Bylaws? Why don't you
> [ prepare something
> [ > to be posted when the public comment process starts in a few weeks (or
> [ > sooner, technology willing)?
> [ >
> [ > [ 1) Is the ICANN Board going to take up in Cairo Jonathan Weinberg's
> [ > [ suggestions on improving the role of the membership? (See
> [ >
> http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/comment-bylaws/msg00015.html ) Is some
> > [ action required from outsiders to make this more likely? If the Board
> > [ not planning to do this, is there going to be an explanation as to why
> > [ this is not in order? (Please consider this a formal request to agenda
> > [ this issue if such a request is required.)
> > I'm sure Jonathan's suggestions will be given careful consideration by the
> > Board. I'll ask him to repost them in the dedicated comment forum, once
> > it's been launched.
> > [
> > [ 2) Also, is the issue of new DNSO constituencies going to be in order in
> > [ Cairo? If not, when will the IDNO issue actually be discussed and
> > [ resolved?
> > [
> > I've advised the Board that I don't think any of the proposals for
> additional constituencies (including the IDNO and variations on it) have met
> the test of broad support. If the Board receives a proposal for a new
> constituency that bears evidence of broad support among individuals (which
> means many more than 35 individual members, in my view), I'll certainly
> advise them to consider it. The Board can only act on actual proposals,
> though. Is there a new effort underway to organize a broad-based, open and
> inclusive constituency for individuals domain name holders?
> > [ 3) While I'm asking questions, do you know anything about the pending
> > [ applications for reconsideration that have been filed with ICANN? Is
> > [ there a page that summarizes the status of these matters?
> > [
> > The reconsideration committee page is at
> <http://www.icann.org/reconsideration/recon-committee.htm>. It's a bit
> outdated at the moment, which is entirely my fault. I'm going to try to get
> it updated this afternoon.
> > Best regards,
> > --Andrew
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