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Re: [council] RE: ICANN Budget for 2001-02

on 22/01/01 17:01, Peter de Blanc at pdeblanc@usvi.net wrote:

> Greetings:
> It has come to our attention that ICANN made a call to business constituency
> to join in the Budget Task Force. No such call has been received yet by the
> ccTLD constituency.
> We (ccTLD) wish to make clear that we expect full participation in this
> exercise, with the same number of representatives from our constituency as
> the maximum number of representatives coming from any other constituency.
> We would like to avoid a repetition of the "Cairo Incident", where our
> consensus-appointed representatives were turned away from the face-to-face
> budget meeting.
> We also feel that the level of representation available to various
> constituencies is disproportionate to the level of (requested)
> contributions, with many constituencies paying nothing at all.
>> 21 January 2001
>> ccTLD position on ICANN funding for the 2001-2002 fiscal year
>> -------------------------------------------------------------
>> Whereas:
>> 1. The ICANN President's Task Force on Funding main document is in
>> http://www.icann.org/tff/tff.htm
>> 2. The initial TFF did prepare the budget for ICANN Fiscal Year
>> 1999-2000 (July 1999 to June 2000), this budget was re-conducted
>> as it for ICANN Fiscal Year 2000-2001
>> 3. The ICANN staff is currently requesting some of DNSO
>> Constituencies to delegate their representatives no latter than
>> 24 January 2001 to the budget group that will be providing input
>> on the formulation of ICANN's budget for the 2001-2002 fiscal year,
>> the ccTLD constituency urges ICANN to reconsider budget matter
>> on more global and coherent level.
>> In 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 and for approximately 5 million USD per year
>> the aggregate shares among classes of ICANN constituents are:
>> A. gTLD registrars and registry = 55%
>> - gTLD registrars = 50%
>> - gTLD registry = 5%
>> B. ccTLD registries = 35%
>> C. IP address registries = 10%
>> It makes for 90% of funds being provided from the DNSO Constituencies.
>> But, and the most important, this 90% is requested only from
>> three (3) DNSO Constituencies: Registrars, gTLD, ccTLD, whilest
>> the remaining four (4) do not fund ICANN at all: Business,
>> The ccTLD Constituency does not believe that such a scheme is fair,
>> and urges ICANN to explore new allocations, such as:
>> 1. equilize the shares between Domain Names and IP Addresses,
>> and make it 50-50
>> 2. equilize  the shares between Domain Names Constituencies,
>> by collecting funds from all seven groups:
>> Business, ISPCP, IPC, NCDNH, gTLD, ccTLD and Registrars
>> The ccTLD Constituency intend to work closely with ICANN staff
>> on all ccTLD-ICANN matters, including funding, over the scheduled
>> February meetings in Hawaii and Geneva. This position is being
>> issued to make well known in advance that the ccTLD share imposed on
>> ccTLD is unfair and unrealistic. This is evidenced by the actual total
> contributions of ccTLD to budget to date.
> A more equitable distribution of the cost-recovery algorithm should insure a
> more reliable revenue stream for essential ICANN operations.
>> Peter de Blanc
>> Elisabeth Porteneuve
>> Oscar Robles Garay
>> ccTLD NC Representatives
Useless to say that, as a representative of the Non-commercial constituency,
I do not support the position of Peter about that. I consider that the
relationship between DNSO and ICANN is everything (see the by-laws) but a
shareholder model, where the voting rights are directly link to the number
of shares (or to the amount of money brought in). As Mike pointed out, it is
important to split correctly the functions: contributing to ICANN mission
and supporting financially ICANN. The rule for the first point should be
dependent of the contribution of the constituencies in terms of policy
related matters, whereas the rule for the second point would be linked to
the amount of money the constituencies are making out of the Internet.
ICANN would make a serious mistake by considering the second point as the
unique model for its relationship with DNSO members. A cost-recovery
algoritm should certainly not be the key rule.
Best regards

Dany VANDROMME                    |  Directeur du GIP RENATER

                Reseau National de Telecommunications
         pour la Technologie, l'Enseignement et la Recherche

                                  |  ENSAM
Tel   :  +33 (0)1 53 94 20 30     |  151 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Fax   :  +33 (0)1 53 94 20 31     |  75013 Paris
E-mail: Dany.Vandromme@renater.fr |  FRANCE

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